INTERNATIONALE DISSIDENZ

Ben Kamis/ Jannik Pfister/ Philip Wallmeier

The Constitution of Rule in Political Spaces beyond the Nation-State

GOETHE
UNIVERSITÄT
FRANKFURT AM MAIN

NORMATIVE ORDERS
Exzellenzcluster an der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main

DFG

1. INTRODUCTION

Scholars in IR are increasingly trying to understand the formation of order beyond the nation-state, focusing especially on phenomena of authority, hierarchy, and rule. The search for new ways to think order beyond hegemony in a 'realist' anarchy or a hierarchy of utility-maximizing cooperation has led to greater dialogue between IR and other disciplines, such as sociology, political theory and geography. This paper aims to critically contribute to these conceptualizations of order and *Herrschaft*[1] beyond the nation-state by bringing together the concept of rule with recent theorizing about political space beyond the nation-state and insights from human geography. This offers a more nuanced way to make the exercise of rule beyond the nation-state analytically describable, namely in how it transforms space, a dimension often neglected in recent accounts of rule. We do so building on our empirical research in three case studies of a common research project on "The Transnationalization of Rule and Resistance".

Attempts to describe hierarchy and rule beyond the nation-state have become increasingly prominent in IR in recent years (Onuf and Klink 1989, Hurd 2007, Lake 2009, Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). One recent contribution that defines rule as all asymmetric power relations that are reinforced and perpetuated by political institutions (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014, 7) is especially useful in liberating thought about Herrschaft beyond the nation-state from the liberal infatuation with authority, while retaining its critical potential and without falling for a denunciation of all rule as illegitimate. This wide concept of rule allows us to describe formal and informal political institutionalizations, ruling not only through decisions with binding authority, but also through other forms of issue-specific governing, depoliticizing discourse, forms of subjectivation, and, crucially, through the way they transform space. Yet this is where Daase and Deitelhoff, among others, still have an important blind spot: they mostly neglect the dimension of space in their analysis by focusing on forms of the institutionalization of rule.[2]

---

[1] Many English words, ranging from the power-centric 'domination' to the legitimacy-centric 'authority', have been equated with *Herrschaft*. Following Onuf and Klink (1989) and Daase and Deitelhoff (2014), we use 'rule' as a more versatile, less loaded, and more accurate translation.

[2] In a similar way, the main contenders for advanced conceptions of political space beyond the nation-state have only a very limited conception of rule: as polity, which entails either a social contract, a *system* of rule through distribution, or authority (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996b); or in a focus on the social as relations of communication, but rarely as relationships of super- and subordination (Albert et al. 2009). Thus, the argument could be put the other way around: existing conceptions of space need to be complemented with a better theorization of rule. Our focus here lies on space, though.

Most scholars that have considered the role of space more directly would agree that within nation-states rule was and is, in a very fundamental way, exercised through spatialization, here specifically through territorialization (Brenner and Elden 2009), that is by "delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area" (Sack 1986, 6). In the Westphalian System, loyalties were distributed and identities fixed by flattening space, by "reduc[ing] it to two dimensions" (Albert and Brock 1999, 35). Rule within nation-states constitutes space such that an inside can be separated from an outside through borders located at the end of the inside – an idea only feasible if space is considered to be flat. Different spatializations that do not work through the delineation of surface escape this flattened conception of space.

Recent contributions of rule beyond the nation-state, mostly focusing on institutionalization through concepts like 'order' or 'regime', pay little attention to spatialization even though space played such an important role in conceptualizing rule within the nation-state. These ignore earlier findings of geographers that "each new form of political power introduces its own particular way of partitioning space, its own particular administrative classification of discourses about space and about things and people in space. Each such form commands space, as it were, to serve its purposes" (Lefebvre 1991 [1974], 281). Since the 1980s, social and cultural studies have increasingly (re)discovered space which, as several political geographers have stressed, is the link to social materiality, for space "is both an essential part of the character of, and perpetually reconfigured through, political practice" (Massey 2005, 183). Its neglect in recent attempts to theorize rule and hierarchy beyond the nation-state is thus as grave as it is surprising.

In this paper, we propose a perspective that shows the concrete benefits of studying rule by looking at space. In what follows, we argue that existing contributions to theorizing political space beyond the nation-state, while ground-breaking, only cover some of its aspects, focusing on loyalties and identities. We then translate the concept of lived space from political geography to account for the constitution of embodied practices in space as an important aspect of rule. In three short empirical examples from our ongoing research, we then show how many aspects of political space defy cartographical mapping, and how similarly many forms of rule defy an easy institution-based description. Our central point, then, is that focusing on the constitution of lived space through practices makes rule visible in its spatialization.

2. POLITICAL SPACE BEYOND THE NATION-STATE

In its early days, the discipline of IR, and the interwar world in which it emerged, displayed a veritable obsession with space. This focus continued through the early days of the Cold War, with its metaphors of containment and spheres of influence. But as the focus shifted from positions and statics towards interactions and dynamics, towards the integrating power of regimes and governance, IR's spatiality waned. Yet for some time now, space has re-emerged as a central concept. At least since John Agnew diagnosed the "territorial trap" IR found itself thinking about the social production of space questioning the assumption of states as fixed units of sovereign space, the distinction between domestic and foreign politics, as well as the assumption of states as 'containers' of societies (Agnew 1994).

Of course, dissatisfaction with the concept of the international and the discrete spatial units it implies is not new. Marx was already aggregating factors of production across national boundaries despite living in a period of fervent economic nationalism (Renton 2001). A similar disjuncture was visible in IR during the 1980s, when, just as the international system seemed to be reaching its starkest expression of territorial exclusivity and state centricity, Kratochwil (1986) began problematizing exactly that imaginary. Since then, methodological nationalism and the view that the state is the principal spatial container of social relations implied by the concept of 'the international' have become increasingly untenable (Pries 2001). Instead, "the image of a global sociospatial organization as a multiperspectival mosaic composed of superimposed levels, scales and morphologies has […] become more viable […] than the traditional cartograhpy of homogenous, mutually exclusive blocks of territory" (Brenner 1997, 157).

Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach have furthered this line of enquiry by proposing to look at a broad range of historical forms of political organization in order to better understand how system affiliations evolve, and various kinds of "polities attract loyalties and exercise authority", that is, "to exercise significant influence or control across space over persons, resources, and issues" (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996a, page). They continued to be central to the development of a spatial perspective on differentiating global politics, arguing that the boundaries of territorial states "increasingly do not demarcate political spaces based on economic, social, or cultural interests" (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004, 74) and showed how "today's postinternational world exhibits boundaries among authorities and networks of authorities that overlap with and transcend the sovereign boundaries of states", a proliferation of polities, "highly specialized spheres of authority

[...] with little hierarchical arrangement among them" (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004, 141). In his condemnation of the international imaginary, Mansbach (2003) notes that people have always lived in overlapping communities with fluctuating hierarchies of identity, which leads him to the adopt the concept 'postinternational'.

In attempts to think about space beyond the nation-state, the transnational has received the most attention within IR and social theory more generally. Matthias Albert and others, starting from a perspective that stresses the increasing differentiation of global politics and described the development of new cultural representations and constructions of identity that are in tension with projects of territorialization (Albert and Brock 1999), have more recently proposed the concept of 'transnational political spaces'. The emphasis here is on the "emergence of common political representation and symbolic structures in a transnational context" (Albert et al. 2009, 19). They follow Ferguson and Mansbach in their description of political space and its link to authority as well as in the need to 'remap' it. By defining political space as the area where identities and representations are negotiated, they helpfully expand the concept of transnationalism to include such phenomena as the symbolic aspects of culture, discourse, othering and socialization. But while these two conceptualizations of space as distribution of loyalty on the one hand and space as discursive sphere of identity formation on the other have clearly furthered our understanding of political space(s) beyond the nation-state, they also overlook an important aspect of spatialization, namely, its lived quality that is embodied in practices and materiality.

People often intuitively think of space as the surface of the earth with mountains, glaciers, lakes and rivers, which is also how early geographers conceived of it. In other words, space is often thought of as if perceived from the top of a tall building. However, this is only one way to think about space, which geographers have called 'first space' (Elden 2010). A different way to conceptualize space, called 'second space', is as a representation, as is often found in advertisements or drawings or national flags. This space of representations is what is most commonly referred to as political space beyond the nation-state; that is "the ways in which identities and loyalties among adherents to various polities are distributed and related" (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004) or "a sphere in which common representations and identifications are negotiated" (Albert et al. 2009, 7). What they depict is more an abstract discursive level in the formation of political space rather than qualities of space as communicated and lived.

However, a different perspective opens when political spaces beyond the nation-state are also viewed through the lens of this "third space", which is both material and symbolic. This type of space may be understood "as directly lived, with all its intractability intact [….] the space of 'inhabitants and users'" (Soja 1996, 67). Through the lens of third space we can study how particular (groups of) people experience and give meaning to a city, a bar, a shopping mall, a country, local communities, or other political spaces. This is especially relevant since political spaces beyond the nation-state "are not given and cannot be reduced to an abstract and self-regulating development of globalization or de-nationalization, but are always established and formed by identifiable actors in their discourses and practices" (Albert et al. 2009, 19). If, however, we are interested in how these spaces are established through discourses and practices, it is necessary to remember that social practices are performed by bodies in space. They are "embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understandings" (Schatzki 2001, 2, see also Brickell and Datta 2011). Praxeological approaches, gaining increasing salience in the study of International Relations too (for an overview see Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 22), point out that in trying to understand order, it is insufficient to describe either only a material constellation or free-floating meaning. Rather, in studying subjectivation, the dichotomy between object/subject, material/ideal must be transcended in order to dissect the social as produced and reproduced through practices, which are regular, (mostly) pre-reflexive, embodied social activities within an already interpreted environment (Reckwitz 2003).

Because the practices that constitute political spaces are always firmly situated within an already interpreted environment, the material arrangements of human bodies and artifacts that constrain and enable social practices (Reckwitz 2012, 251), we believe that studying them requires thinking of space as "third space" (which includes the representational aspects of "second space" as well as the materiality of "first space"). This understanding of space allows us to capture political spatialization beyond the nation-state to a fuller extent. Only if we complement the existing focus on representations with an explicit focus on the lived experience, the practices and subjectivities that create space and are created by it, are we able to fully engage with the transformations of political spaces today. And only then are we able to describe not just the effect of power on space but also how "power may be seen as an effect of the entanglements, emerging from spatial assemblages rather than somehow pre-existing them in disembodied but coherent units" (Sharp et al. 2005, 24).

But such an understanding of space as third space requires an empirical reconstruction of how space is constituted in a particular context. Thus, in the following section, we draw on three empirical examples to show how specific practices constitute a virtual, a transnational, and a translocal political space that of course rests on spaces of representation, but can only be fully understood if we look at the lived space of embodied practices.

3. EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES

Rule is an important concept in IR that is not reducible to either hegemony or hierarchy; rule and space are intimately related through practices. By situating objects in relation to each other and infusing their locations and motions with meaning, practices are the acts of rule, and space is the stage on which they play out. However, space is not a pre-existing set of x-dimensional coordinates, nor the standardized representations of coloured maps and flags full of more or less symbolic imagery. Rather, political space is instantiated in the living. That is, subjects engaging with objects and each other in space – and their experience of this engagement – is what gives space its defining characteristics like proximity, distance, speed, intimacy and so on, just as the possibilities afforded by institutionalized spaces shape the kinds of subjectivity possible. Rule shapes the experience of space, and space channels the activity of rule.

In this section we demonstrate our claims with three empirical illustrations. The first example deals with European data regulation in 'virtual' space. It serves to show that regulation from what would normally be considered a supranational body affects the range of experience and possibilities available in a space that exists only as an informational construct. The second example describes how the formal structures of rule in many western democracies are, for the purpose of many political practices, a secondary consideration relative to transnational police networks. Instead of national constituencies and relations of hierarchical political delegation determining the boundaries of political spaces and the types of rule activity that exist in them, transnational networks of police have resulted in an increasingly homogenous culture of protest policing with the result that what counts as protest and how it is treated extends across a new, multi-sited postnational security space. The third example describes networks of eco-villages, in which each is intensely local in terms of material production and close social relationships but is also bound into a broader network of like communities with like practices. The character of the immediate relationships is reinforced through particular practices that serve to structure social relationships through proximity and assembly, but the villages' ambitions as a movement clearly also connects them as groups. Thus, they are a paradigmatic case of translocality:

clusters of social proximity connected to each other over sometimes great distances. In each instance, practice is the carrier of spatial experience, and it is the vehicle of rule in space.

3.1. Postnational rule in virtual spaces

In this section we consider how European Internet regulation gives form to a space despite its virtuality, which militates against a spatial approach because of its seeming formlessness. The first point to consider is what the ontology of cyberspace would look like in geographic or strictly representational terms, and there is indeed very little here to consider. Second, we describe briefly in what terms cyberspace is a lived space, in what sense it is virtual, and how rule as practice applies to it. Third, we will reconstruct the European vision of digital order by looking at how it has regulated data and how it has populated the Internet with institutions and types of person to maintain that order.[3] Finally, we will consider how these ordering institutions spatialize the Internet by shaping the roles and possibilities of those experiencing this virtual space and how they do so.

Before examining European rule in and through cyberspace, we should first describe the scope of the phenomenon. Although the term 'cyberspace' emerged in 1980s science fiction, and in that period it had only a limited practical meaning in the mainframe-terminal network architecture that was popular at the time, it became a common and meaningful term during the early and mid-1990s. Until that time, the Internet was a network for and by academic and (American) military institutions and was only accessible through unintuitive lines of alphanumeric code. The advent of HTML, however, made remote content in practically any digital form accessible with an intuitive interface that felt like navigating through a combination library-museum full of textual exhibits, multimedia installations, and a fairly large gift shop. The intuitiveness of the Internet has increased over the last two decades such that almost every adult and a great many children carry powerful and constantly connected computers in their pockets and vehicles that integrate them into a vast world of social relations, knowledge, discourse, media content and surveillance that they access and engage with astounding ease and fluidity.

---

[3] The process of spatialization was reconstructed by examining publicly available EU law covering data regulation. Regulations concerning transmission media, like radio frequencies and cable speeds, would provide another means of tracing the contours of this space. However, most such regulations are mere conventions to coordinate activities and achieve interoperability, and most types of digital data are fairly indifferent to the media that carry them. Data regulation, on the other hand, defines what can exist in cyberspace, how and for how long, which are questions that extend beyond mere coordination equilibria.

Considerable effort has been devoted to trying to understand the 'space' of cyberspace. Perhaps the most common view is to treat it as an inapt figure of speech and to focus on the territoriality of the physical infrastructure that underlies it. For example, Goldsmith and Wu (2006) argue that the Internet is an arrangement of physical technologies in geographical space, and this geographical space is covered by potentially overlapping but generally exclusive territorial jurisdictions, so the space of 'cyberspace' is and always has been terrestrial. Others argue that, given the status of the Internet as a shared resource, some kind of international condominium under a common or universal jurisdiction would be a better way to organize the Internet (Hollis 2012, Mueller 2010). A third view is that, while cyberspace might be a distinct kind of space, it could conceivably develop more or less exclusive domains *within* itself, each governed by different institutions and constituting a parallel but different order to the one that applies in terrestrial geography: a virtual world of 'cybernations' (Wedgwood 2004-2005). Each of these perspectives starts with the structures of regulatory rule, and the spatiality of cyberspace is a derivative consequence of these. None, however, considers space or rule as a question of the phenomenology of cyberspace, how it is experienced and how the rules that apply in it shape that experience.

In order to consider cyberspace from the inside, we must first clarify what 'living' in cyberspace means and how this life relates to practice and rule. The first point to note is that the experience of 'living' in cyberspace can be categorically different from that of physical space. The particular characteristics of cyberspace, such as the lack of any experiential correlation between time and space, the practically limitless possibilities of self-representation, and the ability either to preserve objects and data indefinitely or to obliterate them without a trace, allow for ways of life disanalogous to those afforded by corporeal subjectivity. As the integration of cyberspace into everyday terrestrial life becomes deeper and more constant, many are becoming at least part-time cyborgs (Cleland 2010, Haraway 1991). A single human being can maintain an indefinite number of virtual subjectivities, each of whose biographical and physical characteristics are radically variable. Even those users who try to reflect their embodied self as accurately as possible in cyberspace spend considerable time maintaining and cultivating that reflection, during which they are not inhabiting physical space. In order to represent oneself to a distant acquaintance or potential employer, one has to direct one's attention away from, to leave, one's immediate physical companions and become at least temporarily a virtual subject. Many occupants of cyberspace may not even have a physical human correlate and exist instead as artificial intelligences with the goal, for example, of generating traffic on an online

dating community or eavesdrop on private conversations for surveillance or marketing purposes. Virtual subjects do not inhabit physical space, even though their experience depends on physical technology. Rather, virtual subjectivity exists in virtual space.

Data regulation is the key to uncovering rule in cyberspace because data is the material of the virtual world, and altering how that data is stored and manipulated alters the shape and possibilities in that world. Practice, as arrays of activity whose meaning is more or less a matter of intersubjective agreement, must then be considered in virtual terms. This would suggest that, for example, allowing or banning anonymity in online interactions would significantly affect how the subjects involved experience that space by limiting the opportunities for virtual personification and connecting it to terrestrial jurisdictions through rewards and punishments (Clark 2013, Zingales 2014). Data processing algorithms, then, also become technologies of rule, as is the case when, for example, an algorithm is charged with implementing the deletion or caching of content relating to a physical human (Simmons 2014). These algorithms can preserve, alter or annihilate the biography of a virtual subject in the world of virtual subjectivity, simultaneously changing what further digital or, in some cases, corporeal practices are possible. Because virtual space is contingent on the storage and transfer of data, data regulation co-constitutes that space.

The EU began staking out the territory of virtual space already in the mid-1990s with its early regulation on data processing and privacy. The first articles of these documents almost uniformly consist of populating the institutional landscape with various kinds of legal person and artifact, and as technology has progressed and the forms of interaction it mediates have expanded over the past two decades, this landscape has become increasingly crowded. The initial type of person legally inserted into European cyberspace was the data subject, which refers to the virtual correlate to the natural person to whom personal digital data pertains, and this 'naturalization' occurred already in 1995. Although subjects are generally those capable of acting, the European data subject was defined in far more passive terms as a type of surface onto which discrete data were ascribed and recorded. Even the data subject's rights are construed in terms of rules about how data can be processed rather than abilities the subjects have to act, with the exception of the right to demand information about who is processing which of their data and how (European Commission 1995). The capacity to act was more prominent on the side of controllers, who oversaw data processing, processors, supervisory authorities, member states, who could legislate around the rules and implement some of them, and the Working Par-

ty, an intergovernmental institution effectively charged with providing a vision of good digital order.

Over time, however, the complexity of the social and institutional network grew alongside that of the technological network. In 2002 the user was born, who was able to actively use a service rather than be a correlate to an existing inscription. It also became easier to identify unique users and maintain the connection of data to them by making it easier for them to retain a uniquely identifiable number across services in 2009 (European Commission 2009a). Further, the data itself gained a modicum of personality (European Commission 2002b). For example, the category of traffic data was invented, referring to what is now known as meta-data: data about data. Thus, the actual data became a type of data subject in itself with attendant rules about how its data could be processed. Certain kinds of privileged data emerged as well, with 'communications' being granted greater protection than broadcasts. Location, genetic and biometric data, referring to the physical location of the users in terrestrial space as well as their physical characteristics, were also granted special statuses in 2002 and a proposed 2012 directive as well (European Commission 2002a, 2012). While one could consider these incursions of terrestrial space and its inhabitants into cyberspace, it is perhaps more accurate to represent them as the representations they are: encoded digital scripts inhabiting new territories in cyberspace whose boundaries' permeability is specifically regulated.

The cast of orderers expanded as well. Two new institutions appeared in 2009 to serve the apparently conflicting visions of a 'secure' data space that allowed fluid movement and easy entry and exit on the part of the various entities, especially commercial ones. The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) was devised to achieve the first goal and the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) was to achieve the second (European Commission 2009b, a). These were envisioned in effect as the immigration officers and border police of the proliferating digital spaces, encouraging the migration deemed desirable and patrolling to prevent unwanted breaches.

These waves of regulation suggest that spatialization through regulation occurs on two levels. First, the goal and effect of this regulation is to facilitate the virtualization of corporeal subjects by promoting their integration into the virtual world. Further, while nominally subject to the jurisdictional boundaries of terrestrial-international space, these boundaries are faint if at all perceptible in the virtuality of cyberspace. The easier it is for subjects to enter and move within it, which is what happens when modes of data ascrip-

tion and visions of order are standardized, the less the jurisdictional boundaries are keenly felt. Instead, they fade along with other aspects of corporeal experience, like physical appearance and memory. Second, given that cyberspace is structured as a network of nodes linked complexly with various types of connections, proliferating types of node and establishing or altering transmission rules is a way of directly altering the structure of the space. A space with users contains different possibilities and limitations compared to one populated primarily with data subjects, and the permanence or transience of a communication's traffic data affects what can count as recorded virtual history. Thus, the process of ordering cyberspace has created a space of discernible, but mutable, character that is virtual but lived and that is borderless but whose access is differential.

3.2. Transnationalization of protest policing

In this example, we look at the promotion and diffusion of protest policing[4] discourses and practices through an emerging transnational institutionalization. It produces a new political space of social control of protest (cf. Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl 2011, 64), a postnational security space with multi-sited offshoots.

In the last two decades, in liberal democracies in Europe and North America, a discourse on protest policing has emerged that, after two decades of relative tolerance towards protest, emphasizes the threat social protest poses to the public order (Fernandez and Starr 2009). This endangering of public order is represented in new threats, like animal rights activism, the differentiation of spaces with distinguishable threat levels, and the superimposition of the image of the violent criminal on the peaceful protester (Della Porta and Fillieule 2004, Gibson 2013, Scholl 2013, King 2013). This changing discourse on protest policing came to be institutionalized in a transnational network of practitioners, experts, and national and supranational bureaucracies (see Reiter and Fillieule 2006 for a very good description of the initial stages of this institutionalization, Bowling and Sheptycki 2012, 38). These networks comprise supranational institutions and government agencies, such as the Police Cooperation Working Group of the European Council, Europol, or the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and FBI, but also, through processes of expertise and knowledge sharing, Think Tanks, "Fusion Centers", members of law enforcement organizations, researchers and consultancies. The exchange is perpetuated through regu-

---

[4] Protest policing encompasses a wide range of activities through which police try to manage public protest both during and beyond protest events themselves (see Della Porta and Reiter 1998). It includes securing demonstrations, accompanying and repressing them, but also investigation, repression, and additional administrative measures targeting social movements like, for example, the management of urban space.

lar workshops, drafting and consultancy processes, as well as professional meetings and trade fairs. Through practices of active promotion that go beyond learning (Della Porta and Tarrow 2012), most crucially the proactive sharing of 'best practices' through training as well as observation and fact-finding-missions, these networks are vectors for the diffusion across national and organizational borders of the new discourse and the risk assessments and corresponding police strategies it contains.

These cooperative ventures have practical consequences. In the USA, Canada, and many places in Europe, police strategies increasingly aim at managing protest, to contain it with new, above all spatial, strategies, and sometimes to prevent and inhibit it completely (Martin 2011, Monaghan and Walby 2012, Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes 2013, Petzold and Pichl 2013, U. S. National Lawyers Guild 2013). The institutionalization of this specific discourse (Hajer 1995) is transnational because the locus of politics is largely disembedded from national and international structures. This transnational epistemic community (Cross 2013) powerfully engaged in transnational governance (Hale and Held 2011, Kauppi and Madsen 2013) transcends the boundaries of national political organization. The exchanges between the 'transnational professionals of (in-)security' (Bigo 2013) in this case have reached a density at which the primary social space of problem-definition and identity formation seems to have moved to the transnational level of this network. The problems of protest and how to deal with them are increasingly formulated there, even though police is organized nationally or locally. We see a local appropriation or implementation of a transnational discourse (cf. Hakelberg 2014).

The institutionalized epistemic community and expert networks form the place of politics in this case by perpetuating a specific discourse and connected practices and its translation into local social control of protest. This network can, and has to be, described as a transnational political space, as "a sphere in which common representations and identifications are negotiated" (Albert et al. 2009, 7) This is apparent in the common practices of knowledge generation, sorting and exchange and the common symbol and artifact systems (the discourse and the infrastructures of knowledge sorting and exchange), which have reached an intensity where they have become the primary point of reference (Pries 2010, 30), at least concerning the political question of protest policing. The discourse creates new common representations through a novel conception of the 'good order' of society, and new identities of those loyal to it – most importantly, experts and police officers. This order supplants a narrowly defined internal security, however vague this concept has always been in terms of stability and the right to an unperturbed, if depoliti-

cized, execution of daily 'domestic' life as the purported realization of basic rights. In its implementation, it could also be considered an instance of post-international rule, in the sense of Ferguson and Mansbach's definition of polity (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996b), since loyalty is demanded of its subjects through the distribution of basic political values and freedoms.

But in the dimension of local implementation of this transnational discourse, the perspective of third space reveals important aspects of spatialization that go beyond these functions. Through material practices, the new protest policing aims at the subjects, making them internalize new conceptions of legitimate and illegitimate protest, erecting new internalized instances of self-control, and conceptions of what a well-ordered life as citizen should entail. This transnational public order is endangered from the outside by, for example, itinerant 'extremists', but also from the inside by radicalization and disruptions. The space is delineated from the outside through borders (common shielding mechanisms), and this distinction is upheld internally by mechanisms aimed at distinguishing good from dangerous protest. Moving away from a focus on territories and spheres, and towards lived space, we can see various elements of the spatialization of this new postnational order of protest policing. These include:

Risk zoning and fences: Protest in urban landscapes and at international summits is increasingly managed and contained through fences demarcating 'no protest zones', a strategy of territorial exclusion aimed separating protest from decision-makers 'at risk' or from the vulnerable economic life of the city (Mitchell and Staeheli 2005, Della Porta 2006, Petzold and Pichl 2013, Herbert 2007).

New forms of containment and exclusion through inclusion: a proliferation of 'kettling' as a policing strategy (the corralling and flexible containment through cordoning of large groups of protesters or entire demonstrations) and institutions such as 'free speech pens' or 'protest zones' is marked by new levels of (temporary) containment of bodies and exclusion from the larger public forum through their strategic incapacitation (Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl 2011, 38-39, Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes 2013).

New, differentiated border controls: in the European Union, border controls are temporarily reinstated in the Schengen zone of free movement, specially aiming at 'risk travellers' (Reiter and Fillieule 2006, 151, Scholl 2013, 118). Through practices of control, frisking, identification, surveillance, preventive arrests and area/travel bans, acceptable protesters are regularly differentiated from 'endangerers' travelling across national or

local borders within the European Union and across the Atlantic, facilitated by international (surveillance) cooperation (O'Neill 2004, Jasch 2012).

These are but the most prominent features of the spatialization of the new transnational public order of acceptable protest (others not detailed here include the emergence of transnational spying and infiltration including personal relations with activists, for example, cf. Loadenthal 2014). A focus on the materiality of third space is necessary to reveal something that representations alone would conceal: how forcefully this political space is erected, how it aims at the embodiment of its order by its subjects, and how it can develop in a discontinuous, multi-sited/'jumping' way across the globe.

The political space that emerges in this case is a new postnational space of social control of dissent, a new postnational public order that has to be safeguarded. No longer is internal security and public order limited to the single nation-state. Rather, international summits and other events and localities of 'critical' importance are being included in a space of public order where national societies cease to be main referent of the discourse, if not of the narrative of justification (although one increasingly wonders where the fluid boundaries of 'the West' are). It covers the domain of the United States, Canada, and the European Union at least, with gradations fading out into its neighbors. First, radicalization has to be prevented where it takes place, even if it is 'outside' the new postnational security space (in training camps, activist gatherings abroad, etc.); second, security cooperation agreements with more or less democratic regimes around the globe result in the wider diffusion of risk perceptions and strategies, as in Egypt or Brazil, for example. What could conventionally be described as transnational cooperation or governance constitutes a case of transnational rule insofar as the place of politics has shifted, and from its new location a new (partial) political order in the sense of 'a police' (Rancière 1999, 28-29) is generated. This rule is spatialized in a new, multi-sited postnational political space of security (cf. Ingram and Dodds 2009, 2-3, Mitchell 2010).

3.3. The formation of transnational political spaces in eco-communities

In this section we show how eco-communities constitute space in such a way that they can be considered a node of rule in the global arena. For this description, we first give a very short overview of what eco-communities are and how they form political spaces. Second, we show what an analysis of the political space of communities overlooks if the constitution of space is only analyzed in terms of representations and identities. Third, we consider how eco-communities construct political space through architecture, agriculture

and rituals. Forth and last, we summarize these findings in order to show that eco-communities constitute political spaces as spaces of rule.

Eco-communities are groups of people who decide to live together and somewhat apart from "mainstream society" in order to live a more just and sustainable life. It is difficult to estimate how many eco-communities can be found (mainly in the global North) today; approximations vary between 800 to 3000 communities of more than 100 inhabitants (Grundmann and Kunze 2012). From a historical perspective, eco-communities follow the back-to-the-land communes of the late 1960s and early 1970s. They differ, however, in terms of stability, aims and organization from their predecessors. While the late 20th and early 21st century is the period with the highest density of (intentional) communal groups ever, many of these communities are now connected through communication channels and people, forming a dense network of loyalties, which Yaacov Oved (2012) has described as "the globalization of communes". While most communal groups behave according to the laws of the country they are situated in, they constitute transnational spaces in that they develop much stronger loyalties with each other than with the surrounding national communities. If communards were to speak of themselves as citizens at all, they would not claim to be part of a national citizenry but rather citizens of Gaia (Mother Earth). In order to emphasize this cohesion and integration between communities, Grundmann and Kunze (2012) even speak of "transnational communitization [Vergemeinschaftung]". Eco-communities (from the internationally famous "Auroville" in India to the "Findhorn Ecovillage", a former center for the New Age Movement in the United Kingdom, to the family-like, religious "Konohana community" in Japan) remain inside of state territory while also creating spaces of normative cohesion, solidarity and loyalties that, on the one hand, reach *beyond* the national "community" but are, on the other hand, restricted to smaller circles within larger societies. In this sense, eco-communities may be considered a paradigmatic case of political space beyond nation-states.

We can aptly describe these communities as *transnational political spaces* or even as *polities* in which loyalties are distributed and in which identities are fixed. Such a description appropriately emphasizes the dynamics of normative integration beyond the nation-state that are clearly at play here. With such an analysis of loyalties and identities, however, it remains unclear how this integration is achieved. The distribution of loyalties and the fixation of identities are not mere accidents but the outcome of certain activities of rule. These activities may be found not only in the way in which decisions are made in most

communities but even more so in how conflicts are solved or even prevented, in the way the economy is organized and architectural arrangements connect bodies.

In contrast to many back-to-the-land communes of the late 1960s and early 1970s, few contemporary eco-communities use a plenum with consensus decision-making to regulate their daily lives together. Rather, most communities use a decision-making procedure in which groups of people take the responsibility for a certain sphere of community life (food, architecture, finances); one member of each group reports to the representatives of the other groups. This decision-making procedure is often accompanied by a rule stating that those who reject a proposal have to invest their own time in order to make a counter-proposal. Even though these decision-making procedures may be considered as part of a form of rule in which some people make binding decisions representing others, a closer look reveals that these procedures are not the principle locus of rule in eco-communities. Rather, power is exercised through rituals and procedures that regulate the community *atmosphere*. For example, many German communities use the *Forum* as a means to prevent conflicts from escalating. In the *Forum*, all members who have a stake in a decision form a circle together. Proposals can be presented by one person and one person only who steps into the circle of people and "speaks from the heart". This process is supposed to integrate and thereby channel emotions into the process of communication. Organizing the unfolding of conflicts in such a way individualizes conflicts, it turns them into conflicts between people rather than between groups of interest, and it limits who can say what: e.g. it would be impossible to present a proposal in a detached or instrumental way. When community-members "sense" a conflict in the group, they can also invite people to take part in the Forum, thereby (at times) putting considerable pressure on the others, since it appears to be quite difficult to argue against a true and honest exchange within the community. Another example of a procedure through which communities exercise authority over the atmosphere is a ritual that is used in some smaller French communities: on Friday evening all communards have to look each other in the eyes (one-on-one) and declare that they forgive each other for the pain they have caused during this week. This, a young woman explained, has the effect that usually conflicts bubble up before Friday and can hence be cleared out early. This focus on the personal level of interactions, however, cannot be understood without reference to the communities' spatial and architectural organization, which can be found (or is at least aspired to) in most eco-communities around the world (Litfin 2014). The community rituals described above, for example, are unthinkable in a typical American suburb. An accepted community building – big enough to fit all members of the community – is necessary.

Having a community building is, however, not only a necessary practical requirement. Rather, as the expert on ecovillage design Bang (2002) explains: the architecture of eco-communities should lead to "quality human interaction" (19). The architectural design has a specific aim, as Newmann and Jennings (2008) point out: "[t]he physical characteristics of a sustainable community help to create a sense of community – a sense of ownership, commitment and a feeling of belonging to a larger whole" (50), a "whole" that includes community members as well as the place in which the community is situated. This aim finds its expression also in closed water-cycles, dry-toilets, houses that are directly carved out of the surrounding mountains and a reliance on the community's ability to produce food. Through these arrangements, eco-communities attempt to transcend the dichotomy between I/You and nature/culture. For example, by attempting to produce the food for the community entirely on their own and within their "place", eco-communities do not rely on food transportation from far away. This, in turn, makes communards dependent on each other and on the space surrounding the community. Through this intentionally established dependency, the interconnection between people, social reproduction and the environment is made visible: communards have to rely on each other and have to take care of the environment. Hence, by restricting what can be brought inside of a community, the community shapes the members' relationship to each other and the environment. This, in turn, produces a kind of communal space that is separate from the "outside world" or "mainstream society" (two terms often heard in eco-communities). The difference that is introduced between inside and outside manifests itself most clearly for people who would like to become part of the group. In nearly all communal groups, newcomers have to go through a trial-out period in which they live in the community (sometimes for more than a year) so that community members see how they get along with each other as well as how well the "applicants" follow and cope with the community's procedures. Hence, by restricting "what gets in" (people as well as goods), eco-communities *contract* space into a particular place.

To sum up: rule is exercised in eco-communities not primarily through binding decision-making. Rather eco-communities regulate their daily lives together by clearing the atmosphere within their communities and through a type of architecture that shapes the communards' connection and emotional relation to each other. The combination of architecture, rituals and their reliance on the community's land creates identities and loyalties in a specific way, thereby separating not only an inside from an outside but also permitted from forbidden actions.

4. CONCLUSION

This paper aims to contribute critically to a research agenda trying to describe and theorize order beyond the nation-state. Our point of departure is the recognition that recent theorizations of rule beyond the nation-state exhibit an important blind spot: their neglect of space as a meaningful category of analysis. This is surprising since the importance of space for rule within the nation-state has long been recognized. Further, this shortcoming is grave since geographers have pointed out the constitutive importance of space for political practice and for practices of rule more generally.

In order to fill this gap, we reflect upon recent theorizations of space beyond the nation-state and show the important progress they have made in describing political spaces in their different forms, pointing especially to how identities are fixed and loyalties are negotiated beyond the borders of nation-states. We also show, however, that these conceptualizations often depend upon an implicit understanding of space that approximates what geographers have called "second space", the space of representations. This, we argue, may not be sufficient in order to describe how spaces of rule are constituted through practices in the global realm. Rather, a broader conceptualization of space is needed that goes beyond identities or loyalties and accounts for its materiality and the subjectivities that it engenders. A wider account must make explicit that by situating objects in relation to each other and infusing their locations and motions with meaning, practices are the acts of rule, and space is the stage on which they play out. This enhanced perspective allows us to describe how orders of rule beyond the nation-state are spatialized not only in their representations but also in their materiality while linking the two.

We illustrate this approach and its strengths with three examples: the regulation of data in virtual space by the EU, the policing of a postnational space of protest policing and the construction of trans-local eco-communities. In all three examples new spaces of representation emerge. However, we also point out, that a perspective on representations is limited in its understanding of rule. We show that rule becomes more clearly visible in the constitution of third space – the material and experienced environment where all political practice and subjectivitation takes place. Of course, this is linked but irreducible to the place of representation.

In the case of European data regulation, cyberspace is represented in analogy to underlying physical infrastructures or structures of regulatory rule. However, only if we look at what 'living' in cyberspace means, can we see how rule is really exercised: that data regulation alters how data is stored and manipulated and, therefore, alters the shape and pos-

sibilities in this virtual world. Through the mutable definition of roles, a virtual space comes into existence with virtual subjectivity, both bounded and limitless in their transformative possibilities.

In the case of protest policing, a new transnational discourse is shown to create a novel conception of the 'good order' of society on the level of representations. However, it is especially through material spatial practices that the policing rules: it aims at the subjects, making them internalize new conceptions of legitimate and illegitimate protest, new instances of self-control, and conceptions of what a well-ordered life as citizens should entail. Thus, a new, multi-sited postnational security space arises.

In the case of translocal networks of eco-communities, a focus on representation brings to the stage how communards create a space of normative cohesion, solidarity and loyalties that, on the one hand, reach beyond the national "community" but are, on the other hand, restricted to smaller circles within larger societies. However, it is also and necessarily on the material level that we can appreciate how rule is exercised within eco-communities. Specifically, this relates to how they regulate their daily lives and behavior together by clearing the 'atmosphere' within communities and through a type of architecture that shapes the communards' connection and emotional relation to each other.

To sum up, rule beyond the nation state always implies spatialization. While the space of representation is one important dimension, rule can be better analyzed if the level of material practices constituting (political) third space is taken into account as well. This allows for a more complete reconstruction of rule beyond the nation-state.

REFERENCES

Agnew, John. 1994. "The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international relations theory." *Review of International Political Economy* no. 1 (1):53–80. doi: 10.1080/09692299408434268.

Albert, Mathias, Gesa Bluhm, Jan Helmig, Andreas Leutzsch, and Jochen Walter. 2009. "Introduction: The Communicative Construction of Transnational Political Spaces." In *Transnational Political Spaces*, edited by Mathias Albert, Gesa Bluhm, Jan Helmig, Andreas Leutzsch and Jochen Walter, 7–31. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.

Albert, Mathias, and Lothar Brock. 1999. "What Keeps Westphalia Together? Normative Differentiation in the Modern System of States." In *Identities, Borders, Orders. Re-thinking International Relations*

Theory, edited by Mathias Albert, David Jacobson and Yosef Lapid, 29-49. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Bang, M. Jan Martin. 2002. "Permaculture Design: Philsophy and Practices." In *Ecovillage living: restoring the earth and her people*, edited by H. Jackson and K. Svensson, 18-19. White River Junction: Chelsea Green Publishing.

Bigo, Didier. 2013. "Security: Analysing transnational professionals of (in)security im Europe." In *Bourdieu in international relations*, edited by Rebecca Adler-Nissen, 114–130. London: Routledge.

Bowling, Benjamin, and James Sheptycki. 2012. *Global Policing*. London: Sage.

Brenner, Neil. 1997. "Global, fragmented, hierarchical: Henri Lefebvre's geographies of globalization." *Public Culture* no. 10 (1):135-167.

Brenner, Neil, and Stuart Elden. 2009. "Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory." *International Political Sociology* no. 3 (4):353–377.

Brickell, Katherine, and Ayona Datta. 2011. *Translocal geographies: Spaces, places, connections*. Burlington: Ashgate.

Bueger, Christian, and Frank Gadinger. 2015. *International Practice Theory. New Perspectives*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Clark, Liat. 2014. *European ruling on anonymous comment liability shouldn't be universally damaging* 2013 [cited 17.10. 2014]. Available from http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-10-14/european-courts-privacy-ruling.

Cleland, Kathy. 2010. "Prosthetic Bodies and Virtual Cyborgs." *Second Nature: International Journal of Creative Media* no. 2 (1):74-101.

Cross, Mai'A K. Davis. 2013. "Rethinking epistemic communities twenty years later." *Review of International Studies* no. 39 (01):137-160. doi: doi:10.1017/S0260210512000034.

Daase, Christopher, and Nicole Deitelhoff. *On the Reconstruction of Global Rule on the Basis of Resistance: International Dissidence Working Paper 1/2014* 2014. Available from http://dissidenz.net/en/publications/working-papers/.

Della Porta, Donatella. 2006. "Policing Transnational Protest: An Introduction." In *The Policing of Transnational Protest*, edited by Donatella Della Porta and Abby Peterson, 1-12. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Della Porta, Donatella, and Olivier Fillieule. 2004. "Policing Social Protest." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, 217–241. Malden: Blackwell.

Della Porta, Donatella, and Herbert Reiter. 1998. *Policing Protest. The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Della Porta, Donatella, and Sidney Tarrow. 2012. "Interactive Diffusion: The Coevolution of Police and Protest Behavior With an Application to Transnational Contention." *Comparative Political Studies* no. 45 (1):119–152. doi: 10.1177/0010414011425665.

Elden, S. 2010. "Land, terrain, territory." *Progress in Human Geography* no. 34 (6):799–817. doi: 10.1177/0309132510362603.

European Commission. 1995. "Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data." *Official Journal of the European Communities* no. L 281/31.

European Commission. 2002a. "Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Services Directive)." *Official Journal of the European Communities* no. L 337/11.

European Commission. 2002b. "Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications)." *Official Journal of the European Communities* no. L 201/37.

European Commission. 2009a. "Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/ED concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws." *Official Journal of the European Union* no. L 337/11.

European Commission. 2009b. "Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office." *Official Journal of the European Union* no. L 337/1.

European Commission. 2012. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data. In *2012/0010 (COD)*.

Ferguson, Yale H., and Richard W. Mansbach. 1996a. "The Past as Prelude to the Future? Identities and Loyalties in Global Politics." In *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, edited by Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, 21-44. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Ferguson, Yale H., and Richard W. Mansbach. 1996b. *Polities: Authority, identities, and change, Studies in international relations*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Ferguson, Yale H., and Richard W. Mansbach. 2004. Remapping Global Politics: History's Revenge and Future Shock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fernandez, Luis, and Amory Starr. 2009. "Legal Control and Resistance Post-Seattle." *Social Justice* no. 36 (1):41–60.

Gibson, Shannon. 2013. "State-led social boundary change: transnational environmental activism, 'ecoterrorism' and September 11." In *Power and Transnational Activism*, edited by Thomas Olesen, 130–150. London: Routledge.

Gillham, Patrick F., Bob Edwards, and John A. Noakes. 2013. "Strategic incapacitation and the policing of Occupy Wall Street protests in New York City, 2011." *Policing and Society* no. 23 (1):81–102. doi: 10.1080/10439463.2012.727607.

Goldsmith, Jack, and Tim Wu. 2006. *Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Grundmann, Matthias, and Iris Kunze. 2012. "Transnationale Vergemeinschaftungen: Interkulturelle Formen der sozial-ökologischen Gemeinschaftsbildung als Globalisierung von unten?" In *Transnationale Vergesellschaftungen. Verhandlungen des 35. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Frankfurt am Main 2010.*, edited by Hans-Georg Soeffner, 357-369. Wiesbaden: SpringerVS.

Hajer, Maarten. 1995. *The Politics of Environmental Discourse. Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hakelberg, Lukas. 2014. "Governance by Diffusion: Transnational Municipal Networks and the Spread of Local Climate Strategies in Europe." *Global Environmental Politics* no. 12 (5):107–129. doi: 10.1162/GLEP_a_00216.

Hale, Thomas, and David Held. 2011. *Handbook of transnational governance: New institutions and innovations*. Chichester: Polity Press.

Haraway, Donna. 1991. "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century." In *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*, 149-181. New York: Routledge.

Herbert, Steve. 2007. "The "Battle of Seattle" revisited: Or, seven views of a protest-zoning state." *Political Geography* no. 26 (5):601-619.

Hollis, Duncan. 2012. Stewardship versus Sovereignty? International Law and the Apportionment of Cyberspace. *Legal Studies Research Paper Series*.

Hurd, Ian. 2007. *After anarchy. Legitimacy and power in the United Nations Security Council*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ingram, Alan, and Klaus Dodds. 2009. "Spaces of Security and Insecurity: Geographies of the War on Terror." In *Spaces of Security and Insecurity: Geographies of the War on Terror*, edited by Alan Ingram and Klaus Dodds, 1-18. Farnham: Ashgate.

Jasch, Michael. 2012. "Gefährderansprachen und Aufenthaltsverbote als Kontrollsanktionen der Polizei." In *Der Kampf ums Recht*, edited by Josef Estermann, 137-149. Wien: Beckenried

Kauppi, Niilo, and Mikael Rask Madsen. 2013. *Transnational power elites: The new professionals of governance, law and security*. London: Routledge.

King, Mike. 2013. "Disruption is Not Permitted: The Policing and Social Control of Occupy Oakland." *Critical Criminology* no. Online First. doi: 10.1007/s10612-013-9198-z.

Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1986. "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System." *World Politics* no. 39 (1):27-52.

Lake, David A. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations: Authority, Sovereignty, and the New Structure of World Politics*.

Lefebvre, Henri. 1991 [1974]. *The Production of Space*. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith. Malden: Blackwell.

Litfin, Karen 2014. *Ecovillages: Lessons for a Sustainable World*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Loadenthal, Michael. 2014. "When cops "go native": policing revolution through sexual infiltration and panopticonism." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* no. 7 (1):24-42. doi: 10.1080/17539153.2013.877670.

Mansbach, Richard. 2003. "The meaning of 11 September and the emerging postinternational world." *Geopolitics* no. 8 (3):16-34.

Martin, Greg. 2011. "Showcasing security: the politics of policing space at the 2007 Sydney APEC meeting." *Policing and Society* no. 21 (1):27–48. doi: 10.1080/10439463.2010.540659.

Massey, Doreen. 2005. *For Space*. London: Sage.

Mitchell, Don, and Lynn A. Staeheli. 2005. "Permitting Protest: Parsing the Fine Geography of Dissent in America." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* no. 29 (4):796-813.

Mitchell, Katharyne. 2010. "Ungoverned space: Global security and the geopolitics of broken windows." *Political Geography* no. 29 (5):289-297. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2010.03.004.

Monaghan, Jeffrey, and Kevin Walby. 2012. "'They attacked the city': Security intelligence, the sociology of protest policing and the anarchist threat at the 2010 Toronto G20 summit." *Current Sociology* no. 60 (5):653–671. doi: 10.1177/0011392112448470.

Mueller, Milton. 2010. *Networks and States*. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.

Newman, Peter, and Isabella Jennings. 2008. *Cities as sustainable ecosystems: principles and practices*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

O'Neill, Kate. 2004. "Transnational Protest: States, Circuses, and Conflict at the Frontline of Global Politics1." *International Studies Review* no. 6 (2):233-252. doi: 10.1111/j.1521-9488.2004.00397.x.

Onuf, Nicholas, and Frank F. Klink. 1989. "Anarchy, Authority, Rule." *International Studies Quarterly* no. 33 (2):149-173. doi: 10.2307/2600535.

Oved, Yaacov. 2012. *Globalization of Communes: 1950-2010*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Petzold, Tino, and Maximilian Pichl. 2013. "Räume des Ausnahmerechts.: Staatliche Raumproduktionen in der Krise am Beispiel der Blockupy-Aktionstage 2012." *Kriminologisches Journal* no. 45 (3):211–227.

Pries, Ludger. 2001. "The Approach of Transnational Social Spaces: Responding to New Configurations of the Social and the Spatial." In *New Transnational Social Spaces. International Migration and Transnational Companies*, edited by Ludger Pries, 3–33. London: Routledge.

Pries, Ludger. 2010. *Transnationalisierung: Theorie und Empirie grenzüberschreitender Vergesellschaftung*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Rancière, Jacques. 1999. *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Reckwitz, Andreas. 2003. "Grundelemente einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken: Eine sozialtheoretische Perspektive." *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* no. 32 (4):282–301.

Reckwitz, Andreas. 2012. "Affective spaces: a praxeological outlook." *Rethinking History* no. 16 (2):241-258. doi: 10.1080/13642529.2012.681193.

Reiter, Herbert, and Olivier Fillieule. 2006. "Formalizing the Informal: The EU Approach to Transnational Protest Policing." In *The Policing of Transnational Protest*, edited by Donatella Della Porta, Abby Peterson and Herbert Reiter, 145–210. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Renton, David. 2001. *Marx on Globalisation*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Sack, Robert David. 1986. *Human territoriality: its theory and history*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schatzki, Theodore R. 2001. "Introduction: Practice Theory." In *The practice turn in contemporary theory*, edited by Theodore R Schatzki, Karin Knorr-Cetina and Eike Von Savigny, 1-14. London/New York: Routledge.

Scholl, Christian. 2013. *Two sides of a barricade: Order and summit protest in Europe*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Sharp, Joanne P., Paul Routledge, Chris Philo, and Ronan Paddison. 2005. *Entanglements of power: geographies of domination/resistance*. London: Routledge.

Simmons, Natasha. 2014. "Forget Me Not? Europe's 'Right to be Forgotten' in the Google Age." *Business Law Review* no. 35 (6):202-206.

Soja, Edward W. 1996. *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and other real-and-imagined places*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Starr, Amory, Luis Fernandez, and Christian Scholl. 2011. *Shutting Down the Streets. Political Violence and Social Control in the Global Era*. New York: New York University Press.

U. S. National Lawyers Guild. 2013. Developments in the Policing of National Special Security Events: An Analysis of the 2012 RNC and DNC.

Wedgwood, Ruth. 2004-2005. "Cyber-Nations." *Kentucky Law Journal* no. 88 (957-965).

Zingales, Nicolo. 2014. "Virtues and Perils of Anonymity: Should Intermediaries Bear the Burden?" *JIPITEC* no. 5:155-171.

Zürn, Michael, Martin Binder, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt. 2012. "International authority and its politicization." *International Theory* no. 4 (01):69-106. doi: doi:10.1017/S1752971912000012.